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The Good, the Bad, and the Badass: Reflections on Kant's Conception of Moral Evil
In Significance and System: Essays on Kant's Ethics, M. Timmons, ed. New York: Oxford University Press (2017).
Love of Honor, Emulation, and the Devilish Vices in Kant's Ethics
With Houston Smit, in Kant's Lectures on Ethics, Lara Denis and Oliver Sensen, eds. Cambridge University Press (2015).
Exploring Intuitions on Moral Twin Earth: A Reply to Sonderholm
With Terry Horgan, Theoria 1-21 (2015).
The Moral Significance of Gratitude in Kant's Ethics
With Houston Smit, Southern Journal of Philosophy 49: 295-325 (2011).
Ethical Conservatism and the Psychology of Moral Luck
With Shaun Nichols and Theresa Lopez, in Empirically Informed Ethics, M. Christen, J. Fischer, J. Huppenbauer, C. Tanner, & C. van Schaik, eds., Springer (2013).
Reflections on the Project, Problems, and Promise of Moral Phenomenology
In Prolegomenon to Moral Phenomenology, M. Kholdadadi, ed. & trans., Tehran: Qoqnoos Publications (2013). (Trans. and published in Farsi.)
Kant's Grounding Project in the Doctrine of Virtue
With Houston Smit, in Kant's Theory of Practical Justification: Interpretative Essays, M. Timmons and S. Baiasu, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013): 229-268.
Introspection and the Phenomenology of Free Will: Problems and Prospects
With Terry Horgan, Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2011)180-205.
The Perfect Duties to Oneself as an Animal Being
In Kant's Tugendlehre, A. Trampota, O. Sensen, and J. Timmermann, eds., Berlin & New York: de Gruyter (2013): 229-268.
A. C. Ewing's First and Second Thoughts in Metaethics
With Jonas Olson, in British Moral Philosophy from Sidgwick to Ewing, T. Hurka ed., Oxford University Press (2011)183-211.
Untying a Knot from the Inside Out: Reflections on the 'Paradox' of Supererogation
With Terry Horgan, Social Philosophy & Policy 27 (2010): 29-63.
Mandelbaum on Moral Phenomenology and Moral Realism
With Terry Horgan, in I. Verstegen (ed.), Maurice Mandelbaum and American Critical Realism, Oxford: Routledge (2010): 105-126.
What Does the Frame Problem Tell us About Moral Normativity?
With Terry Horgan, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2009): 25-51.
Contrastivism, Relevance Contextualism, and Meta-Skepticism
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2008): 802-810.
What Can Moral Phenomenology Tell us about Moral Objectivity?
With Terry Horgan, Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (2008): 267-300.
Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment
With Terry Horgan, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2007): 279-295.
Prolegomena to a Future Phenomenology of Morals
With Terry Horgan, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2008): 115-131
Moorean Moral Phenomenology
With Terry Horgan, in Moorean Themes in Epistemology and Ethics, S. Nuccetelli & G. Seay, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2007): 203-226.
Ethical Objectivity Humanly Speaking: Reflections on Putnam's Ethics without Ontology
Contemporary Pragmatism 3 (2006): 27-38.
Toward a Sentimentalist Deontology, Moral Psychology, vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007): 93-103.
Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory
With Terry Horgan. Philosophical Issues (2005)
The Philosophical and Practical Significance of Kant's Universality Formulations of the Categorical Imperative Jarbuch fur Recht und Ethik, (2005).
Expressivism, Yes! Relativism, No!
With Terry Horgan, in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Russ Shafer-Landau, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006): 73-98.
The Categorical Imperative and Universalizablity
in Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: New Interpretations, Christof Horn & Dieter Schoenecker, eds. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter (2006).
Cognitivist Expressivism
With Terry Horgan in Metaethics After Moore, T. Horgan & M. Timmons, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006):255-298.
Morality without Moral Facts, (with Terry Horgan), in Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, James Dreier (Ed.), Oxford: Blackwell (2006):
Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth
With Terry Horgan in Essays on the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Ian Ravenscroft, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009).
The Limits of Moral Constructivism
Ratio 16 (2003), pp. 391-423. Also published in P. Stratton-Lake (Ed.), What We Owe to Each Other, Blackwell Publishers (2004): 90-122.
Ethics
in Reflections on Philosophy 2nd edition, L. McHenry and T. Yagisowa (Eds.), Longman's Publishers (2003): 103-25.
Does Morality Depend on God's Commands?
in Conduct and Character 5th edition, M. Timmons (Ed.), Wadsworth Publishing Co. (2006): 38-49.
The Nature and Evaluation of Moral Theories
in Conduct and Character 5th edition,M. Timmons (Ed.), Wadsworth Publishing Co. (2006): 1-15.
Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism
With Terry Horgan, Philosophical Issues 12 (Realism and Relativism), Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva (Eds.) (2002): 74-96.
Motive and Rightness in Kant's Ethical System
in Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays, Mark Timmons (Ed.), Oxford University Press (2002), pp. 255-288.
Copping Out on Moral Twin Earth
With Terry Horgan, Synthese 124 (2000): 139-151.
Expanding Epistemology, Social Epistemology 12, (1998): 253-65.
Will Cognitive Science Change Ethics?
A Review Essay of Mind and Morals, Philosophical Psychology 10 (1997): 531-540.
Decision Procedures, Moral Criteria, and the Problem of Relevant Descriptions in Kant’s Ethics
Jarbuch für Recht und Ethik (Annual Review of Law and Ethics) 5, (1997): 389-417.
From Moral Realism to Moral Relativism in One Easy Step
With Terry Horgan, Critica XXXVIII (1996), pp. 3-39.
Troubles for Michael Smith’s Metaethical Rationalism
With Terry Horgan, Philosophical Papers 25 (1996): 203-231.
Outline of a Contextualist Moral Epistemology
in Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, W. Sinnott-Armstrong and M. Timmons (eds.), Oxford University Press (1996): 293-325.
Evil and Imputation in Kant’s Ethics
Jarbuch für Recht und Ethik (Annual Review of Law and Ethics) 2 (1994): 113-141.
Metaphysical Naturalism, Semantic Normativity, and Meta-Semantic Irrealism
With Terry Horgan, Philosophical Perspectives 4 (Issue on Naturalism and Normativity) (1993): 180-204.
Moral Justification in Context
The Monist 76 (1993); 360-378.
Irrealism and Error in Ethics
Philosophia 22 (1993): 373-406.
Necessitation and Justification in Kant’s Ethics
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992): 223-261.
Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The Open Question Argument Revived, (with Terry Horgan), Philosophical Papers 21 (1992): 153-175.
Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived
With Terry Horgan, Synthese 92 (1992): 221-260.
Kant on the Possibility of Practical Propositions
Proceedings of the 7th International Kant Congress (1991): 415-427.
New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth
With Terry Horgan, Journal of Philosophical Research 16 (1991), pp. 447-65. Reprinted in Rationality, Morality, and Self-Interest, edited by John Heil, Rowman & Littlefield (1993): 1-33.
Putnam’s Moral Objectivism
Erkenntnis 34 (1991): 371-399.
On the Epistemic Status of Considered Moral Judgments
Southern Journal of Philosophy 29, supplementary volume (1990): 97-129.
The Aims, Structure, and Evaluation of Moral Theories
in Conduct and Character: Readings in Moral Theory edited by Mark Timmons, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., (1990), pp. 1-23.
What’s Wrong with Paul Moser’s Intuitionistic Foundationalism?
With Kevin Possin, Philosophical Studies 56 (1989): 199-208.
McCarthy on Practical Necessitation in Kant
Kant-Studien 80 (1989): 198-207.
Subjective Truth, Objective Truth, and Moral Indifference
With Michael Gorr, Philosophical Studies 55 (1989): 111-116.
Foundationalism and the Structure of Ethical Justification
Ethics 97 (1987): 595-609.
Kant and the Possibility of Moral Motivation
Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (1985), pp. 377-398. I
Introduction to Ethical Universalizability
With Nelson Potter, Morality and Universality, Nelson Potter and Mark Timmons (Eds.), Dordrecht Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co. (1985): ix-xxxii.
Act Utilitarianism and the Moral Fanaticism Argument
Philosophical Studies 46 (1984): 214-226.
Contradictions and the Categorical Imperative
Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 66 (1984): 394-412.
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