Research Interests (in no particular order):
Kant's Doctrine of Virtue: A Guide (Oxford UP, 2021). This is a commentary on Kant's final work in ethics, The Doctrine of Virtue, Part II of the 1797 Metaphysics of Morals, in which he sets forth his normative ethical theory.
Significance and System: Essays on Kant's Ethics (Oxford UP, 2017). This is a collection of some of my published work on Kant's ethics, including some I've co-authored with Houston Smit.
Sorin Baiasu and I are editing a collection of 44 newly written essays by renowned scholars covering a vast range of topics from the entire Kantian corpus entitled The Kantian Mind to be published by Routledge Press.
Metaethics & Moral Phenomenology
Terry and I are recipients of a John Templeton Foundation Grant in support of our writing a book in progress, Illuminating Reasons: An Essay in Moral Phenomenology. This grant also supported a conference featuring eight talks and streamed live.
WiNE & OSNE
A selection of papers from the Workshop is published in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Volumes 1-10 are in print.
"The Phenomenology of Kantian Respect for Persons," with Uriah Kriegel. In R. Dean and O. Sensen (eds.), Respect. Cambridge University Press (2021): 84-105.
"Normative Ethics," The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, H. LaFollette (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, Ldt (June 2020): https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee907.
"The Good, the Bad, and the Badass: Reflections on the Descriptive Adequacy of Kant's Conception of Moral Evil," in Significance and System: Essays on Kant's Ethics, New York: Oxford University Press (2017).
"Doctrine of Virtue," In S. Baiasu and M. Timmons (eds.), The Kantian Mind, Routledge Press, forthcoming.
"The Phenomenology of Deliberation and the Non-Naturalistic Fallacy," with Terry Horgan. In N. Sinclair (ed.), The Naturalistic Fallacy. Cambridge University Press (2019): 226-250.
"Gripped by Authority," with Terry Horgan, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, special issue on normativity (2018): 1-24.
"The Phenomenology of Moral Authority," with Terry Horgan In New Essays on Moral Skepticism, D. Muchaca (ed.). Cambridge University Press (2018): 115-140.
"Sentimentalist Moral-Perceptual Experience and Realist Pretensions: A Phenomenological Inquiry," with Terry Horgan. In K. Steuber and R. Debes (eds.), Ethical Sentimentalism. Cambridge University Press (2017): 86-106.
"Exploring Intuitions on Moral Twin Earth: A Reply to Sonderholm," with Terry Horgan. Theoria (2015): 1-21
“Emulation, Love of Honor, and the Devilish Vices," with Houston Smit. Essays on Kant’s Lectures on Ethics, Lara Denis and Oliver Sensen (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2015): 256-276.
“Modest Quasi-Realism and the Problem of Deep Moral Error," with Terry Horgan. Essays on the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn, Michael Smith and Robert Johnson (eds.). Oxford University Press, (2015): 190-209.
"Ethical Conservatism and the Psychology of Moral Luck," with Shaun Nichols and Theresa Lopez. In Empirically Informed Ethics, M. Christen, J. Fischer, J. Huppenbauer, C. Tanner, & C. van Schaik, eds., Springer (2013): 160-17.
"Reflections on the Project, Problems, and Promise of Moral Phenomenology," In Prolegomenon to Moral Phenomenology, M. Khodadadi, ed. Tehran: Qoqnoos Publications (2013). (Trans. and published in Farsi.
"Kant’s Grounding Project in the Doctrine of Virtue," with Houston Smit. In Kant on Practical Justification: New Interpretations. M. Timmons and S. Baiasu (eds). Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013): 229-268.
"The Perfect Duty to Oneself as an Animal Being", in Kant's Tugendlehre, A. Trampota, O. Sensen, and J. Timmermann (eds.), Berlin and New York: de Gruyter (2013): 2210243.
"A. C. Ewing's First and Second Thoughts in Metaethics", with Jonas Olson, in Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing, T. Hurka (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2011): 183-211.
"The Moral Significance of Gratitude in Kant's Ethics", with Houston Smit, Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (2011): 295-325.
"Toward a Sentimentalist Deontology", In Moral Psychology, vol. 3, Walter-Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2008.
"What Can Moral Phenomenology Tell Us about Moral Objectivity?" with Terry Horgan. In Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics, E.R. Paul, F.D. Miller, and J. Paul (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2008.
"Moorean Moral Phenomenology", with Terry Horgan. In Moorean Themes in Epistemology and Ethics, S. Nuccetelli & G. Seay (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2007.
"Ethical Objectivity, Humanly Speaking: Reflection on Putnam's Ethics without Ontology", Contemporary Pragmatism, 2007.
"Cognitivist Expressivism", with Terry Horgan. In Metaethics after Moore, T. Horgan & M. Timmons (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2006.
"The Categorical Imperative and Universalizability", in Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: New Interpretations, Christoph Horn & Dieter Schonecker (eds.), de Gruyter, 2006.
"Expressivism, Yes! Relativism, No!" , with Terry Horgan. In Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. I., R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford University Press, 2006.
"Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory", with Terry Horgan. Philosophical Issues 15, 2005.